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INTRODUCTION
In their article, Forging Food Justice Through Cooperatives in New
York City, Dan DePasquale, Surbhi Sarang, and Natalie Bump Vena
(the “Authors”) argue that consumer-owned and worker-owned
cooperatives hold promise as a means for advancing policy objectives
associated with “food justice,” namely building community wealth
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and power and providing more affordable access to healthy food in
low-income and minority communities.1 Looking to examples of
legislation and policies in other jurisdictions, they advocate for a wide
range of policies to promote the viability of cooperatives in New York
City, including reforms to cooperative corporation laws and strategies
for better allocating funding and technical assistance to cooperatives.2
I largely agree with the Authors’ argument and support their effort
to identify practical policy solutions that would help food
cooperatives in New York City overcome barriers to success. This
Response makes three observations about their proposals. First, this
Response observes that food access and economic development are
distinct objectives and that consumer and worker cooperatives may
have different roles to play in food justice strategies depending on
how these objectives are defined and prioritized. Second, the
significance of cooperative corporation statutes may be overstated,
both because a variety of legal entity forms are available to
cooperative organizations (mitigating the impact of potential reforms
to New York’s cooperative corporation law) and because the legal
form itself does not guarantee adoption of many of the values and
principles commonly associated with cooperatives.
Third, this
Response argues that the role of other, non-cooperative
organizational models should not be overlooked in shaping policy in
this area. This Response advocates for a more comprehensive
strategy that promotes a wide range of community-based businesses
and organizations, including but not limited to cooperatives, and that
allocates resources according to the identity of organizations’
stakeholders and the degree of their community impact, rather than
relying on their legal form.
I. DISTINGUISHING AND CATEGORIZING POLICY OBJECTIVES AND
TYPES OF COOPERATIVES
This Part briefly parses the policy objectives and categories of
cooperative models identified in the Author’s article, before
proceeding with an analysis of the Authors’ proposals in Parts II and
III. The objectives of the “food justice movement” identified by the
Authors can be categorized into two central goals: the first, to
“redress food insecurity as well as other inequities throughout the
food system,” by such means as establishing “alternative pathways for

1. See generally Dan DePasquale et al., Forging Food Justice Through
Cooperatives in New York City, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 909 (2018).
2. See generally id. at 937–49.
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bringing healthy food” to underserved communities,3 and the second,
“the economic development and revival of communities and the
creation of sustainable livelihoods.”4 They observe that in both cases,
the “food justice” approach emphasizes community-driven solutions
to structural inequities.5
It is worth noting that food access and economic development are
related, but nevertheless distinct, policy objectives. Further, “food
access” itself is a loaded term, connoting a much-disputed narrative
that lack of physical proximity to healthy food causes food insecurity
and diet-related health disparities.6 Scholars have persuasively
argued that the root causes of such disparities are in fact poverty and
other socioeconomic factors, and have observed that “food access”
strategies aimed at increasing proximity to healthy food in lowincome neighborhoods—in particular, efforts to bring supermarkets
to perceived “food deserts”—have largely been ineffective in
changing health outcomes.7 Law professor Nathan Rosenberg and
public health professor Nevin Cohen criticize food policy that has
“emphasized subsidizing conventional food retailers to increase food
access while shifting attention from the more fundamental upstream
causes of malnourishment and health disparities: social inequality,
Similarly, law
race, gender, class oppression, and poverty.”8

3. Id. at 915–16.
4. Id. at 916 (quoting ROBERT GOTTLIEB & ANUPAMA JOSHI, FOOD JUSTICE 227
(2013)).
5. Id. at 916.
6. In assessing links between poverty and diet-related health outcomes,
policymakers have often focused on the presence of “food deserts”—“communities,
both urban and rural, with severely limited access to healthy and affordable food”—
and framed the issue largely as one of proximity. Deborah Archer & Tamara
Belinanti, We Built It and They Did Not Come: Using New Governance Theory in
the Fight for Food Justice in Low-Income Communities of Color, 15 SEATTLE J. FOR
SOC. JUST. 307, 308, 312–13 (2016). Based on that diagnosis, in recent years there
have been significant subsidies and incentives allocated to the development of
grocery stores in communities considered food deserts, most notably the federal
Healthy Food Financing Initiative. Id. at 312–13. However, several recent studies
have found that the food choices people make are driven primarily by food
preference rather than proximity to supermarkets. A National Bureau of Economic
Research Study found that “[p]articipants who were low-income and had lower levels
of education but who lived in wealthier communities with proximity to healthy foods
made food choices that were similar to the choices made by low-income people living
in low-income neighborhoods with less physical access to healthy food.” Id. at 313–
14.
7. See Archer & Belinanti, supra note 6, at 311–12. See generally Nathan A.
Rosenberg & Nevin Cohen, Let Them Eat Kale: The Misplaced Narrative of Food
Access, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1091 (2018).
8. Rosenberg & Cohen, supra note 7, at 1120.
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professors Deborah Archer and Tamara Belinanti criticize
interventions that embrace a “myopic narrative of food
access . . . centered around problems of proximity,” arguing that “true
access” to food is largely an issue of its affordability and cultural
appropriateness.9 These critiques suggest that, in crafting policy
around food justice-related concerns, policymakers should prioritize
wealth creation and should take a broader and more nuanced
approach to “food access.”
As a related point, consumer cooperatives and worker cooperatives
are inherently different structures and consequently may have
different roles to play in policy strategies. Quite simply, consumer
cooperatives are organized for the benefit of consumers and worker
cooperatives are organized for the benefit of workers.10 As the
Authors observe, these structural features indicate that consumer
cooperatives have the potential to increase affordable food access and
worker cooperatives have the potential to create sustainable
community wealth.11 Of course, neither model is homogeneous;
consumer cooperatives may adopt policies focused on community job
creation just as worker cooperatives may adopt policies focused on
food access. Further, hybrid or “solidarity” cooperatives, like the
Central Co-op in Seattle, may feature both consumer and worker
ownership.12 Nevertheless, the core structural differences between
the two cooperative models imply different policy considerations, and
it therefore may not be effective to group the two together in all
strategies.
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF LEGAL FORMS
The Authors recommend improving the New York Cooperative
Corporations Law (“NYCCL”) as one solution for overcoming
barriers to the success of both consumer and worker cooperatives
(and, by extension, furthering food justice objectives), but this
strategy may overstate the significance of a cooperative’s legal form
for two reasons.13 First, the constraints of the NYCCL are relatively
insignificant as a practical matter because, quite simply, cooperative
organizations in New York are not limited to incorporating under the

9. Archer & Belinanti, supra note 6, at 311–12.
10. DePasquale et al., supra note 1, at 918–19.
11. Id. at 922, 924–25.
12. Co-op Governance, CENTRAL CO-OP, https://www.centralcoop.coop/
governance.php [https://perma.cc/GP5Z-GCQK].
13. See generally DePasquale et al., supra note 1, at 942, 944–45.
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NYCCL.14 Rather, they can employ the same cooperative principles
and enjoy the same favorable treatment under federal law by taking
advantage of more flexible legal entity forms such as the limited
liability company (“LLC”).15 Liberalizing the NYCCL presents only
a limited upside and comes with a risk of eroding the signaling power
of “cooperative” as a corporate name.
Second, and more
importantly, adopting the cooperative corporation legal form does
not guarantee that an organization will embody all of the principles
that are often cited as benefits of cooperatives. Therefore, policy
solutions that focus entirely on legal form, rather than on how an
organization operates or whom it benefits, risk missing the mark.
A. New York Cooperative Corporation Law
To support their proposal to improve the NYCCL as a means of
supporting consumer and worker cooperatives, the Authors look to
other domestic and international cooperative legal regimes as
examples. They primarily focus on reforms that would make the
cooperative corporation a more flexible legal entity.16 As an example
of a more flexible state statute, they cite Minnesota’s cooperative
corporation law, which permits non-patron investors to hold equity in
cooperative corporations coupled with limited voting rights.17 As an
international example, they cite the Quebec Cooperatives Act, which
provides the option of forming a “solidarity cooperative,” a hybrid
form of cooperative with multiple classes of stakeholders as
members.18
While there are certainly other legal regimes that provide more
flexibility than the NYCCL, loosening the constraints of the NYCCL
may have limited practical benefits for a simple reason: organizations
that wish to operate as cooperatives in New York are not limited to
the cooperative corporation statute.19 As noted by the Authors,20

14. Edward W. De Barbieri & Brian Glick, Legal Entity Options for Worker
Cooperatives, 2 GRASSROOTS ECON. ORGANIZING NEWSL. (2011), http://geo.coop/

node/628 [https://perma.cc/79JP-WAZ8].
15. Id.
16. The other legal features that the Authors identify in other jurisdictions as
potential improvements include a host of benefits bestowed on cooperatives in Italy,
including certain income tax and banking law exemptions. DePasquale et al., supra
note 1, at 940–41. A cross-border comparative analysis of cooperative regulatory
exemptions would be a worthwhile endeavor, but is outside the scope of this
Response.
17. Id. at 938–39.
18. Id. at 941.
19. De Barbieri & Glick, supra note 14.
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cooperatives may be formed as New York LLCs or potentially other
business entities that incorporate cooperative principles into their
constitutive documents, rather than forming as cooperative
corporations under the NYCCL.21 LLC statutes offer a highly
flexible form, wherein LLCs can incorporate cooperative principles
while also permitting non-patron equity investments and can
accommodate any permutation of hybrid cooperative structures with
multiple stakeholders.22 In fact, many cooperative organizations in
New York choose to form as LLCs.23 The principal benefit under
federal law of operating as a cooperative—the exemption of
patronage dividends from the cooperative’s income tax pursuant to
Subchapter T of the Internal Revenue Code—does not depend on an
entity’s designation under state law.24 Rather, it applies if an entity
that is considered a corporation for federal tax purposes is “operating
on a cooperative basis.”25 An LLC that elects to be considered a
corporation for tax purposes is eligible to be taxed as a cooperative so
long as it is operating in a way that satisfies the Subchapter T
requirements.26 An LLC that elects to be considered a partnership
for tax purposes qualifies for pass-through taxation, generally making
exemption under Subchapter T unnecessary.27 Therefore, forming a
cooperative under the NYCCL does not provide any particular tax
advantage, and in fact provides less flexibility in tax treatment, as
compared to forming as an LLC.
The principal advantage of incorporating under the NYCCL rather
than as an LLC is that only NYCCL cooperative corporations are

20. DePasquale et al., supra note 1, at 932.
21. De Barbieri & Glick, supra note 14.
22. Id.
23. In the New York City food sector, cooperatives formed as LLCs include
Brooklyn Packers LLC, a worker cooperative that sources, portions, and packages
food, and Bed-Stuy Fresh and Local LLC. See The Brooklyn Packers, BECOMING
EMPLOYEE OWNED: DEMOCRACY AT WORK INST., http://becomingemployee
owned.org/projects/the-brooklyn-packers/ [https://perma.cc/3WUE-CS6F]; Oscar
Perry Abello, Brooklyn Grocery Proving Cooperative Business Works, NEXT CITY
(Jan. 26, 2016), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/bed-stuy-organic-grocery-provingcooperative-business-works [https://perma.cc/LY93-2CX5].
24. I.R.C. § 1381(a)(2) (2017).
25. Id.
26. Thomas Earl Geu & James B. Dean, The New Uniform Limited Cooperative

Association Act: A Capital Idea for Principled Self-Help Value Added Firms,
Community-Based Economic Development, and Low-Profit Joint Ventures, 44 REAL

PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 55, 91–94 (2009) (citing I.R.S. Priv. Ltr Rul. 01-39-020 (Sept. 28,
2001)).
27. Elaine Waterhouse Wilson, Cooperatives: The First Social Enterprise,
66 DEPAUL L. REV. 1013, 1040 (2017).
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permitted to use the term “cooperative” or any variations thereof in
their legal name.28 This prohibition was designed to preserve the
integrity of special words used in corporate names and avoid
confusion.29 Depending on the organization, this distinction may be
significant—particularly in the context of consumer food
cooperatives, the inclusion of the word “co-op” may play an
important role in marketing to consumers. But the restriction is
limited to an organization’s corporate name and does not prohibit a
non-NYCCL organization from otherwise publicizing that it employs
cooperative principles.30
While liberalizing the NYCCL to afford greater structural
flexibility creates a limited benefit, there is potential downside to
doing so as well. As noted by the Authors, the introduction of
outside equity investors, as exemplified by Minnesota’s cooperative
law, may result in the diminishment of patron members’ earnings.31
The more flexible a cooperative statute becomes, the less it will
conform to traditional notions of how cooperatives operate. Indeed,
some members of the cooperative community have voiced concern
about “new generation cooperatives” that raise outside equity capital,
with one commentator observing that “some new generation
businesses appear to have adopted more of an ‘investor’ rather than
‘user’ culture.”32 It is unsettled where to draw the line for how far an
organization can depart from a traditional cooperative format before
it should no longer be considered a “cooperative.” Nevertheless,
there is good reason to draw a line somewhere. As long as
organizations have the option of adopting creative and unorthodox
structures through flexible legal forms like LLCs, the primary
function of the NYCCL is to ensure that when an organization
identifies itself as a cooperative, it comports with a common
understanding of what that word means.
B. The Risk of Making Policy Based on Cooperatives as a Legal
Form
There is a further risk in tying policy entirely to the legal form of
cooperatives. As noted by the Authors, cooperatives often embody
values and principles associated with “food justice,” including
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

N.Y. COOP. CORP. LAW § 3(j) (McKinney 2017).
1970 N.Y. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 31 (N.Y.A.G.), 1970 WL 197708, at *1.
N.Y. COOP. CORP. LAW § 3(j).
DePasquale et al., supra note 1, at 939.
Wilson, supra note 27, at 1038 (quoting Randall E. Torgerson et al., Evolution
of Cooperative Thought, Theory, and Purpose, 13 J. COOPERATIVES 1, 13 (1998)).
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empowerment of low-income communities, civic engagement, and
environmental stewardship.33 However, the cooperative corporation
legal form required by the NYCCL itself does not dictate that an
organization embody these principles. Therefore, there is a risk in
tying policy entirely to the organizational form of a cooperative.
Commentators frequently associate certain values and principles
with cooperatives that go beyond the core identifying elements that
distinguish them from more traditional business forms.34 The
International Cooperative Alliance (“ICA”), a non-profit
international association established in 1895 to advance the
cooperative model, has adopted the following set of seven principles
for cooperatives: (1) voluntary and open membership; (2) democratic
member control; (3) member economic participation; (4) autonomy
and independence; (5) education, training, and information;
(6) cooperation among cooperatives; and (7) concern for
community.35 In an article exploring the opportunities for, and
limitations of, worker cooperatives serving as platforms for grassroots
political activism, law professor Gowri Krishna observes that of the
ICA’s seven principles, only the second and third, democratic
member control and member economic participation, are inherent
Certainly, the
features of the cooperative corporate form.36
democratic nature of those two features creates a framework that is
conducive to more outward-looking principles like education and
concern for community. But as noted by Krishna, the cooperative’s
foundational “one-person, one-vote” democratic structure merely sets
a floor from which those outward-looking principles may be built,
rather than guaranteeing they will be embraced.37
A cooperative may exist primarily to benefit its members without
any larger, outward-facing, community value-oriented goals. Or, in
what is perhaps a more typical scenario, a cooperative may pursue
some value-oriented goals at the expense of other goals. In a case
study of two urban food cooperatives in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,

33. DePasquale et al., supra note 1, at 910–11, 924–25.
34. Gowri J. Krishna, Worker Cooperative Creation as Progressive Lawyering?
Moving Beyond the One-Person, One-Vote Floor, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
65, 83 (2013) (citing Kimberly Zeuli & Jamie Radel, Cooperatives as a Community
Development Strategy: Linking Theory and Practice, 35 J. REGIONAL ANALYSIS &
POL’Y 43, 44 (2005)).
35. Krishna, supra note 34, at 83–84; see also Co-operative Identity, Values &
Principles, INT’L COOP. ALL., https://ica.coop/en/whats-co-op/co-operative-identityvalues-principles [https://perma.cc/6RWT-PBW4].
36. Krishna, supra note 34, at 84.
37. Id.
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urban studies professor Andrew Zitcer identifies a “paradox of
exclusivity” facing consumer food cooperatives.38 When food co-ops
prioritize serving healthy, local, organic foods, prices tend to be high,
in effect excluding low-income consumers.39 When food co-ops
require member labor, often with the express intent to be more
inclusive by making food affordable to anyone willing to commit time,
prices are lower but access is limited to those who can afford to take
uncompensated time, again potentially excluding low-income people
as well as single parents.40 As a result, notwithstanding commonly
espoused values of democratic inclusion, consumer food cooperatives
are frequently perceived as elitist, white spaces.41 As noted by the
Authors, “[n]ew consumer food cooperatives” that have opened in
historically low-income and minority communities, for example, have
faced criticisms that they functionally “serve new, white, middle-class
transplants to these areas and contribute to displacement of long-time
residents,” rather than meeting their needs.42
How, then, can policy strategies better tap into the positive
potential of cooperatives in addressing the issues identified by the
Authors? As noted above in Part I, an important first step is
recognizing that different policy objectives may call for different
approaches, and that worker cooperatives and consumer cooperatives
may serve different purposes. But even accounting for those
differences, relying on basic categories of cooperatives may be
insufficient. Different consumer food cooperatives, for example, may
have widely different priorities regarding price of food, qualities of
food (including organic, local, etc.), member labor requirements, and
other inclusive practices.43 A potential solution is for policy strategies
to focus more on what a business does, and who benefits from that
activity, than on its corporate form. Such an approach not only helps
to identify the “right” cooperatives to support but also, as explored in
the next section, widens the policy lens beyond cooperatives.

38. Andrew Zitcer, Food Co-ops and the Paradox of Exclusivity, 47 ANTIPODE
812, 813 (2015).
39. Id. at 820.
40. Id. at 818.
41. Id. at 813; see also Rachel Slocum, Whiteness, Space and Alternative Food
Practice, 38 GEOFORUM 520, 531 (2007) (identifying “whiteness” as “an organizing
feature of alternative food practices” more generally).
42. DePasquale et al., supra note 1, at 937.
43. Zitcer, supra note 38, at 817–21.
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III. BEYOND COOPERATIVES: THE ROLE OF OTHER ENTERPRISE
MODELS
Cooperatives may be well suited as vehicles for reducing economic
and health disparities in food systems, as argued by the Authors, but
they are not alone in this respect. The benefits cited by the Authors
include both the opportunities for job and wealth creation associated
with the commercial aspects of cooperatives and the opportunities for
education, civic engagement, environmental impact, and affordability
associated with the value-oriented aspects of cooperatives.44 In some
cases, a cooperative may serve as the perfect organizational model for
combining business with more value-oriented purposes in order to
achieve the policy objectives identified by the Authors. However,
while cooperatives are unique in their democratic business structure,
they are far from the only type of enterprise that can achieve these
goals. Sometimes a non-cooperative enterprise may be a natural and
effective fit for the stakeholders involved. As explored below, there
is an important role that entrepreneurs starting more traditional forprofit businesses, as well as non-profit organizations, can play in
reducing economic and health disparities in food systems.45 This is
not to say that policymakers should not find ways to promote
cooperatives. Rather, this Part makes the case that to combat the
inequities associated with excessive corporate consolidation in the
food system, they should promote a wide range of community-based
businesses and organizations, with allocation of resources based on
criteria beyond an organization’s legal entity type.
Before proceeding with an analysis of the role of cooperative and
non-cooperative enterprises in addressing disparities in food systems,
it should be acknowledged that attempting to address these issues
through the promotion of business enterprise—whether cooperative
or otherwise—is a decidedly market-based solution. Scholars have
critiqued market-based food policies as “perpetuating the neoliberal
logics that underlie many of the structural problems we have in
today’s food system.”46 This Response does not suggest that

44. DePasquale et al., supra note 1, at 910–11, 923.
45. See infra Sections III.B, III.C.
46. Michaela Oldfield, Farmers’ Cooperatives to Regionalize Food Systems: A

Critique of Local Food Law Scholarship and Suggestion for Critical Reconsideration
of Existing Legal Tools for Changing the U.S. Food System, 47 ENVTL. L. 225, 256
(collecting sources); see also Kate Meals, Nurturing the Seeds of Food Justice:
Unearthing the Impact of Institutionalized Racism on Access to Healthy Food in
Urban African-American Communities, 15 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE
& SOC. JUST. 97, 128 (2012).
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promoting certain business enterprises is the only solution, or even
the primary solution, to the economic and health disparities that the
food justice movement seeks to redress. Rather, it suggests that these
strategies have a part to play in complementing broader policy
initiatives seeking to reform the food system. In part, this is a
pragmatic response that acknowledges deeper structural reform may
be less politically viable. But it is also an approach that is consistent
with the food justice ethos of seeking community-based alternatives
to the conventional food system rather than relying on state or large
corporate actors to intervene.47
A. The Unique Advantages and Disadvantages of the
Cooperative Structure
In assessing the role that cooperatives can play in furthering food
justice objectives, their unique corporate structure cuts two ways. On
the one hand, their democratic structure arguably makes them ideal
vehicles for building wealth in a manner that keeps jobs, income, and
profits in the community in which they are rooted, particularly in the
case of worker cooperatives.48 On the other hand, depending on the
objectives and resources of the stakeholders involved, the unique
structure of a cooperative may not always be the best fit. As noted by
the Authors, starting any enterprise requires a great deal of time,
energy, and resources, but a cooperative’s democratic selfmanagement structure in many ways requires more.49 In the case of a
worker cooperative, members’ roles as owners require them to invest
more time in work-related matters than they would if they were
merely employees.50 Consumer cooperatives take a wide range of
approaches regarding membership commitments—in particular, as to
whether member labor is required—but in any case, members have a
financial commitment and a role in governance that is not at play

47. Garrett Broad observes that many community organizers and food justice
advocates have “some paradoxical commonalities with limited government
conservatives, having long ago given up on the dream that the federal government
would one day intervene to fully remedy their predicament.” See Garrett M. Broad,
After the White House Garden: Food Justice in the Age of Trump, 13 J. FOOD L. &
POL’Y 33, 37 (2017).
48. See Carmen Huertas-Noble, Promoting Worker-Owned Cooperatives as a

CED Empowerment Strategy: A Case Study of Colors and Lawyering in Support of
Participatory Decision-Making and Meaningful Social Change, 17 CLINICAL L. REV.
255, 266 (2010).
49. See DePasquale et al., supra note 1, at 932–35.
50. See Krishna, supra note 34, at 95 (“Ongoing trainings, education, committee
activities, and other business responsibilities require attention from members.”).
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when a consumer anonymously purchases from a conventional food
store.51 Further, due to their complex structure, both models typically
require technical assistance beyond what is needed for a more
traditional business.52 Success, therefore, requires the presence and
commitment of members who can put in the necessary time, energy,
and resources, which may present a limiting factor to the widespread
adoption of cooperative structures.
In addition to purely practical limitations, a cooperative’s essential
nature as neither entirely profit-maximizing nor entirely valueoriented may not always fit the goals of the relevant stakeholders or,
from a broader policy perspective, the relevant policy objectives. A
cooperative inhabits a dual identity as both a commercial business
and an association of cooperative members pursuing value-oriented
goals—two identities that by their nature are in tension.53 Even when
cooperatives do not adopt outward-facing, value-oriented goals such
as improving the surrounding communities or the environment, their
democratic structure itself implies values beyond pure wealth
maximization. Accordingly, a cooperative’s structure and governing
documents typically limit the return a member can make on his or her
equity.54 Low-income entrepreneurs who wish to create wealth for
themselves may be better served by forming traditional for-profit
businesses than cooperatives. Conversely, both the commercial
aspect of cooperatives and the fact that profits inure to the benefit of
their members indicate that they are not committed purely to
outward-facing, value-oriented goals. A founder focused solely on
value-oriented goals may find a non-profit organizational model to be
more appropriate. From a broader policy perspective, in those
instances when the cooperative model is not the best fit, the policy
objectives identified by the Authors may instead be served by
promoting more traditional for-profit entrepreneurship and nonprofit organizations.

51. See Zitcer, supra note 38, at 817–18.
52. See DePasquale et al., supra note 1, at 932–34.
53. See Krishna, supra note 34, at 93 (citing Johannes Michelsen, The Rationales
of Cooperative Organizations. Some Suggestions from Scandinavia, 65 ANNALS PUB.
& COOPERATIVE ECON. 13, 13 (1994)).
54. See JANELLE ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY: HELPING
BUILD COOPERATIVES, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE, AND LOCAL SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES
195 (2012).
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B. The Role of For-Profit Businesses
An essential element of the “food justice” objectives identified by
the Authors is wealth and job creation in low-income communities.55
As quoted by the Authors, Robert Gottlieb and Anupama Joshi
argue that “[t]he food justice approach is centrally about jobs and
communities and is inherently linked to the economic development
and revival of communities and the creation of sustainable
livelihoods.”56 To that end, the potential for job and wealth creation
presented by low-income entrepreneurs starting traditional for-profit
businesses should not be ignored.
Small business development has played a large role in broader
community economic growth strategies, with some scholars framing
minority entrepreneurship as part of the quest for economic justice.57
Without the same networks on which other entrepreneurs rely,
entrepreneurs in low-income communities face additional challenges.
For example:
All entrepreneurs need capital, access to credit, sound legal advice,
and help with accounting, business planning, and marketing. Urban
entrepreneurs, however, need something more. They need business
coaching, entrepreneurial networks, accessible business education,
and access to social and human capital.58

The success of entrepreneurs in low-income communities not only
presents an opportunity for the creation of wealth as a general matter,
but also comports with the value the food justice movement places on
community-based alternatives to large corporate actors. In particular,
food justice activists have criticized policies that subsidize the
presence of large grocery chains in communities perceived as “food
deserts” without providing an opportunity for community-based
businesses to fill the need.59
55. See DePasquale et al., supra note 1, at 916.
56. See id. at 916 (quoting GOTTLIEB & JOSHI, supra note 4, at 227).
57. See Susan Jones, Small Business and Community Economic Development:
Transactional Lawyering for Social Change and Economic Justice, 4 CLINICAL L.
REV. 195, 199–200 (collecting sources).
58. See Susan Jones, Supporting Urban Entrepreneurs: Law, Policy, and the Role
of Lawyers in Small Business Development, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 71, 73 (2007)
(citing Willie Brown, The Forgotten Type of Capital: Addressing the Social Capital
Deficiency in the Inner City, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 527, 530–36 (2004)).
59. See, e.g., Tanya Fields, End the Corporate Exploitation of ‘Food Deserts’,
EBONY (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.ebony.com/wellness-empowerment/food-justiceend-the-corporate-exploitation-of-food-deserts#axzz53RBc5lDG [https://perma.cc/F4
24-J947] (“In the end, the term [food desert] masks the real harm of the U.S.
corporate controlled food system by suppressing the ability of community
entrepreneurs to develop and finance scalable community solutions.”); Meals, supra
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However, a number of scholars have argued that “focused,
individualistic, entrepreneurial strategies” have proved unsuccessful
as a means of community economic development and poverty
alleviation.60 Some of these scholars have advocated for more
political, broad-based, and collectivist strategies for community
economic development, including “living wage campaigns, worker
cooperatives, and jobs initiatives, not the creation of small startup
businesses.”61 But as observed by law professor Paul Tremblay, in
the context of client selection for community economic development
lawyers, even if assisting individual entrepreneurs falls short from the
perspective of a broader social justice mission as compared to
assisting more collectivist, community-building efforts, that does not
mean doing so is without merit.62 Tremblay notes that:
[Transactional legal services] on behalf of humbly-resourced
entrepreneurs not only assists in the establishment of some tangible
power that might otherwise elude low income clients, but,
importantly, it is what the members of the community have
requested. It is a challenging posture, in the pursuit of rebellious
lawyering, to resist what some members of a client community need
because the lawyer understands that other avenues would be more
fitting of a larger mission.63

A similar argument can be made in the context of policy-making
around food systems more generally. It may be that a successful
cooperative is the ideal mechanism for simultaneously growing wealth
and furthering other value-oriented goals associated with food justice.
But, as long as there are community members who prefer to build
wealth through traditional entrepreneurship or instances where the
cooperative model is simply not feasible, those opportunities for
community wealth generation should not be ignored.

note 46, at 131–32 (“Even though funding initiatives, such as the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services’ Healthy Food Financing, are intended to support local
food projects in practice, large corporations are beating out food justice advocates
because they have the necessary capital to set up their stores quickly.”).
60. Paul R. Tremblay, Transactional Legal Services, Triage, and Access to Justice,
48 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 24–25 (2015) (collecting sources).
61. Id. at 26–27 (citing Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development
as Progressive Politics: Towards a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice,
54 STAN. L. REV. 399 (2001)).
62. See Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Strains in Transactional Lawyering for
Underserved Entrepreneurs and Community Groups, 23 CLINICAL L. REV. 311, 332
(2016).
63. Id.
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C. The Role of Charitable Non-Profit Organizations
Just as the collectivist, value-oriented aspects of the cooperative
paradigm may not appeal to certain aspiring entrepreneurs, the
commercial aspects of the cooperative paradigm may not serve those
whose goals are entirely value-driven. To the extent a policy
objective is to make the healthiest food available at the lowest prices
to the people who need it most, in some cases a charitable non-profit
organization may be the most effective vehicle for doing so. As noted
above, the challenging issues that consumer food cooperatives face in
reconciling membership priorities may result in excluding certain
potential members, often the people who are in the most need. More
generally, cooperatives operate primarily for the benefit of their
members, which may limit the number of people they can impact.64
In some cases “food access” objectives could be better advanced by
non-profit organizations that serve a broad, public class of
beneficiaries and are devoted exclusively to charitable purposes
without balancing those purposes against the business imperatives of
a cooperative.
Perhaps the most visible examples of charitable non-profit
organizations engaged in “food access” work are food pantries, food
banks, and soup kitchens that distribute food at no cost to eligible
recipients, funded entirely by grants and donations of money and
food.65 While these emergency food providers certainly play an
important role in combatting food insecurity,66 they are not
alternatives to conventional corporate food enterprise in the sense
that cooperatives are alternatives (i.e. they are not self-sustaining
models that can exist without donations or other subsidies) and are
therefore not the focus of this section. Instead, this section examines
the concept of charitable non-profits that sell food to paying
customers at reduced costs.
Contrary to conventional wisdom that charities rely primarily on
donations and the common misconception that non-profits cannot be
profitable, fees for services and goods in fact constitute the majority

64. See Krishna, supra note 34, at 94.
65. See SAMUEL ECHEVARRIA ET AL., FEEDING AMERICA, FOOD BANKS:
HUNGER’S NEW STAPLE 3 (2012), http://www.feedingamerica.org/research/hungersnew-staple/hungers-new-staple-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/BC49-4U9X].
66. See Elaine Waxman, The Costs and Impacts of Rising Food Prices Among
Low-Income Households, 8 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 213, 219–20 (2012) (“An analysis of
client visits to Feeding America pantries shows that many Americans rely on food
pantries month after month as a supplemental source of food, including those
receiving SNAP benefits.”).
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of revenue generation for charitable non-profit organizations.67 A
non-profit organization whose primary activity is selling food to lowincome customers at reduced costs can obtain tax exemption under
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code if it can prove that
doing so serves a “charitable purpose” recognized by the IRS.68
Several organizations have recently done just that, innovating the
concept of a non-profit grocery store. A well-publicized example is
the Daily Table, a tax-exempt non-profit retail store founded by
former Trader Joe’s president Doug Rauch, which opened its doors in
Dorchester, Massachusetts in 2015.69 The store offers a free
membership program and collects information from its members to
validate to the IRS that a predominant number of customers live in
low-income ZIP codes.70 It is able to price its food at deep discounts
by securing excess or overstocked items from other retailers, items
that other retailers will no longer hold on the shelf but that still have a
reasonable window of use past the “display code” date.71 The food is
secured either through donations, or deeply discounted purchases,
from those retailers.72 The organization also raises philanthropic
funds from foundations and other donors, but it professes a goal of
reaching a self-sustaining model where revenue from the sale of food
covers costs entirely.73 Other non-profit grocery stores include Fare
& Square in Chester, Pennsylvania, opened in 2014 as a project of the
tax exempt non-profit organization Philabundance,74 and the Jubilee
Food Market in Waco, Texas, opened in 2016 as a project of the tax

67. Fees for services and goods constituted about seventy-two percent of the total
revenue for public charities in 2013. BRICE S. MCKEEVER, URBAN INST., THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF 2015: PUBLIC CHARITIES, GIVING, AND VOLUNTEERING
4–5 (2015); see also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The “Independent” Sector: Fee-for-Service
Charity and the Limits of Autonomy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 51, 104 (2012).
68. “Charitable purpose” is defined in Department of Treasury regulations both
by reference to its “generally accepted legal sense” and by reference to a list of
specific purposes that such term is understood to include. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)1(d)(2) (2017).
69. Susan Adams, How Daily Table Sells Healthy Food to the Poor at Junk Food
Prices, FORBES (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestreptalks/
2017/04/26/how-daily-table-sells-healthy-food-to-the-poor-at-junk-food-prices/2/#1b0
b533a6a41 [https://perma.cc/ZG8Z-5UU8].
70. See FAQs, DAILY TABLE, http://dailytable.org/faqs/ [https://perma.cc/34DXBTKL].
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Quinn O’Callaghan, Desert Fare, PHILA. CITIZEN (May 3, 2017),
http://thephiladelphiacitizen.org/fare-square-chester-pa/
[https://perma.cc/A4Z3DWCJ].
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exempt non-profit organization Mission Waco.75 The non-profit
approach to affordable food access is not limited to retail stores:
charitable non-profit food hubs like the Corbin Hill Food Project, for
example, seek to make fresh local produce more available in
underserved communities by establishing and operating distribution
networks.76
An obvious advantage of the charitable non-profit approach is that,
if tax exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,
non-profit grocery stores are eligible to receive tax-deductible
donations, a powerful fundraising tool.77 Indeed, all three of the nonprofit grocers cited above have received support from large private
foundations or donations.78 But even without the benefit of
philanthropic fundraising, for those focused solely on making food as
affordable as possible, the non-profit approach provides a structural
advantage: unlike a cooperative or a traditional for-profit business, a
non-profit can be organized for the sole purpose of pursuing such a
goal, without having to balance that goal with profitability for the
benefit of owners.
However, those same structural features of non-profit
organizations may thwart one of the central objectives associated with
“food justice,” which is empowering communities and seeking
grassroots, ground-up solutions to inequities in the food system. Both
scholars and activists have critiqued the non-profit sector as a “Nonprofit Industrial Complex” that dampens more radical grassroots
community activism.79 One of the criticisms is that the demands of
complying with regulations, fundraising, and appeasing grantors leads
“non-profits to become increasingly professionalized and divorced
from low-income communities, with boards consisting of donors and
elite professionals, sometimes with tokenistic community
membership, and with senior staff typically coming from relatively
privileged backgrounds.”80
As with other options, the

75. See Mike Copeland, Jubilee Food Market Holds Grand Opening, WACO
TRIB.-HERALD (Dec. 2, 2017), http://www.wacotrib.com/news/nonprofits/jubilee-foodmarket-holds-grand-opening/article_ac2df8c2-6a92-562d-819a-baa8e8c7cb9f.html
[https://perma.cc/5MA4-4WRR].
76. See The Corbin Hill Story, CORBIN HILL FOOD PROJECT, http://corbinhillfoodproject.org/our-story/ [https://perma.cc/9FEB-VQW7].
77. I.R.C. § 170 (West 2018).
78. Copeland, supra note 75; O’Callaghan, supra note 74; FAQs, supra note 70.
79. See Michael Haber, CED After #OWS: From Community Economic
Development to Anti-Authoritarian Community Counter-Institutions, 43 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 295, 316–20 (2016).
80. Id. at 319.
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appropriateness of a non-profit approach depends on a number of
variables, including which “food justice” objectives and values are
prioritized.
CONCLUSION
The Authors present a compelling case for promoting consumer
and worker cooperatives as a means of building community wealth
and power and redressing inequities in “food access” in low-income
and minority communities. This Response does not dispute that
argument, but instead seeks to widen the scope of the Authors’
proposals and poses the question: why stop at cooperatives? While
acknowledging that cooperatives possess certain distinctive
characteristics that make them well-suited as vehicles for reducing
economic and health disparities in food systems, this Response has
made the case that there are limits to relying on corporate form in
crafting policy, and that strategies in this area should look not only to
cooperatives but to a range of organizational models.
What, then, does a more comprehensive strategy look like? It
could involve allocating funding and technical assistance to food
projects primarily on the basis of the identity of the participants and
the nature of the community impact, rather than solely on the basis of
corporate form. For example, the USDA’s Community Food Projects
(“CFP”) Competitive Grant Program awards grants to projects in
part based on alignment with stated goals that include “[meeting] the
food needs of low-income individuals” and “[increasing] the selfreliance of communities in providing for the food needs of the
communities.”81 While grant applicants are required to be non-profit
organizations, the projects themselves are not limited by corporate
form: applicants are encouraged to partner with for-profit businesses
and preference is given to proposals that “[s]upport the development
of entrepreneurial projects” or “[d]evelop innovative connections
between the for-profit and nonprofit food sectors”—with the
common thread that all projects must serve low-income participants.82
A consumer cooperative is one of many potential project structures
the USDA cites as potentially serving the CFP goals.83 As another
example, the New York City Housing Authority’s (“NYCHA”) Food
81. NAT’L INST. OF FOOD & AGRIC., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., COMMUNITY FOOD
PROJECTS COMPETITIVE GRANT PROGRAM: 2018 REQUEST FOR APPLICATIONS 4
(2017) [hereinafter COMMUNITY FOOD PROJECTS], https://nifa.usda.gov/sites/default/
files/rfa/18_CommunityFoodProjectsRFA.pdf [https://perma.cc/YL4H-BJR6].
82. Id. at 5.
83. Id.
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Business Pathways program provides training and resources to food
entrepreneurs, with eligibility based not on organizational form but
on the requirement that participants are NYCHA or NYCHA
Section 8 residents.84 Finally, the Hot Bread Kitchen’s HBK
Incubates program serves as a business incubator for a wide range of
food entrepreneurs but with subsidized rates for low-income
participants, who comprise thirty percent of all members.85
This is not a comprehensive list and is by no means intended to
suggest that existing resources are sufficient to meet the need in this
area. For example, the anticipated amount of funding available for
the CFP program in 2018 is approximately $8.64 million, a relatively
modest amount for a nationwide program.86 Rather, these programs
illustrate a promising approach to build upon, complementing
strategies focused on cooperatives, to remove barriers to entry for
community-based food businesses and organizations of all varieties.

84. See NYCHA Food Business Pathways, N.Y.C. ECON. DEV. CORP.,
https://www.nycedc.com/program/nycha-food-business-pathways [https://perma.cc/2G
SP-6LK8].
85. See Become a Member, HBK Incubates NYC, HOT BREAD KITCHEN,
https://hotbreadkitchen.org/incubates/#become-a-member [https://perma.cc/2MWBWZQR].
86. COMMUNITY FOOD PROJECTS, supra note 81, at 6.

